COMMENTS

A Poor Relation? Regulatory Takings after
Dolan v City of Tigard
Daniel A. Cranet
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just
compensation.' Although the Clause applies most obviously to
the eminent domain power of the state, the Supreme Court has
long recognized that certain land use regulations that stop short
of physical appropriations by the government also fall within the
ambit of the Takings Clause.2 The regulatory takings theory has
produced substantial litigation between landowners seeking to
improve or otherwise use their property, on the one hand, and
government regulators seeking to promote such public goods as
historical and environmental preservation and infrastructure
improvements, on the other.3 In recent years, litigation has focused particularly on attempts by municipalities to condition
approval of real estate development permits on landowners'
dedicating portions 4of their property to public use, a practice
known as "exaction."

t B.A. 1991, Wheaton College; J.D. Candidate 1996, The University of Chicago.
US Const, Amend V. The Takings Clause was incorporated against the states in
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroadv City of Chicago, 166 US 226 (1896).
' See, for example, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393, 415 (1922) (holding
that a land use regulation becomes a taking when it "goes too far").
' See, for example, Pennsylvania Central TransportationCo. v New York City, 438
US 104 (1978) (landowner challenging landmark preservation ordinance); Agins v City of
Tiburon, 447 US 255 (1980) (landowners challenging open-land zoning requirement);
United States v Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US 121 (1985) (landowner challenging
permit requirement for discharge of fill materials into private property).
' See Donald L. Connors and Michael E. High, The Expanding Circle of Exactions:
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The present struggle over regulatory takings in general, and
exactions in particular, is being played out on a vast constitutional stage, against a background that involves not only the Takings
Clause, but also the Court's entire post-Lochner economic and
property rights jurisprudence. Since the end of the Lochner era,
demarked by United States v Carolene Products Co.,' the Court
has generally applied a low level of judicial scrutiny to substantive due process challenges7 to regulations affecting primarily
economic interests.8 Subsequently, the Court extended this low
level scrutiny beyond the economic substantive due process
context to the Takings Clause context. 9 Consistent with the
outcomes of the post-CaroleneProducts substantive due process
cases, the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence has traditionally tended to tilt heavily in favor of the regulatory state.'
From Dedicationto Linkage, 50 L & Contemp Probs 69, 70 (1987). One commentator has
noted that "[a] recent national survey indicates that eighty-eight percent of all communities in the United States require some exactions as a part of the development process."
Emeline C. Acton, Much Ado About NollanL The Supreme Court Addresses the Complex
Network of Property Rights, Land Use Regulations, and Just Compensation in the Keystone, Nollan, and First English Cases, 17 Stetson L Rev 727, 749 (1988), citing Elizabeth
D. Purdam and James E. Frank, Community Use of Exactions: Results of a NationalSurvey, in James E. Frank and Robert M. Rhodes, eds, Development Exactions 126 (Planners
1986).
' Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905). For cases repudiating Lochner's laissezfaire approach to the regulation of economic interests, see Nebbia v New York, 291 US
502, 538-39 (1934) (upholding New York price-fixing statute against substantive due
process challenge); West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish, 300 US 379, 400 (1937) (upholding
statute regulating hours and working conditions of women against due process challenge);
Williamson v Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483, 491 (1955) (holding that Oklahoma statute
regulating opticians did not violate Due Process Clause); Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726,
732 (1963) (rejecting due process challenge to Kansas statute limiting debt adjusting to
lawyers).
304 US 144 (1938).
Substantive due process is the view "that the Due Process Clauses do require that
deprivations of life, liberty, or property be substantively reasonable, i.e., that they be supported by some legitimate justification." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due
ProcessAnalysis, 26 USF L Rev 625, 626 (1992).
' See, for example, Carolene Products, 304 US at 152-53. Notwithstanding this
general rule, heightened scrutiny would be applied where regulations interfered with
certain specifically enumerated rights, or the rights of "discrete and insular minorities." Id
n 4.
In Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594-96 (1962), the Supreme Court
applied a reasonableness standard to a Takings Clause claim. The Court later rejected the
application of this low level scrutiny in Nollan v CaliforniaCoastal Commission, 483 US
825, 834-35 n 3 (1987).
" See, for example, the discussion of Mahon, 260 US 393, in notes 20-29 and accompanying text. A short list of the most significant decisions rejecting regulatory takings
claims would include Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 397 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinances); Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272, 281 (1928) (upholding right of
state to order removal of privately owned trees to prevent the spread of disease to other
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However, over the past eight years, the Rehnquist Court has
begun to reinvigorate the Takings Clause, much to the joy of
property rights activists and to the dismay of environmentalists
and municipal regulators. In its most recent takings case, Dolan
v City of Tigard, the Court held that, when a municipality requires a landowner to dedicate a portion of his land to public use
in exchange for development approval, a taking occurs unless the
impact of the development is roughly proportional to the required
dedication." In addition to announcing this new "rough proportionality" test, the Court noted in dictum that the Takings Clause
should not be a "poor relation" to the First and Fourth Amendments-constitutional protections traditionally afforded a much
more exacting standard of review than that applied to Takings
Clause claims. 2 This statement appears to reverse the settled
presumption that, in the post-CaroleneProducts regime, property interests are "poor relations in the world of rights .... "13
Taken at face value, the poor relation dictum suggests that the
level of scrutiny applied to all Takings Clause claims should be
raised significantly.
Whether the poor relation dictum signals a coming constitutional revolution remains to be seen. This Comment does not
address that question. 4 Rather, it seeks to ascertain whether
the Court acted upon its own suggestion and applied a heightened level of Takings Clause scrutiny in Dolan. To that end, this
Comment confines itself to an analysis of the level of scrutiny

trees); Pennsylvania Central, 438 US at 138 (upholding municipal ordinance requiring
owners of historical landmarks to maintain them in traditional form at their own expense); Pruneyard Shopping Center v Robins, 447 US 74, 88 (1980) (rejecting claim that
state requirement that owners of shopping center allow petitioners to gather signatures
on their property constituted a taking); Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 506 (1987) (upholding law restricting coal mining).
, 114 S Ct 2309, 2319, 2321-22 (1994).
,2 Id at 2320.
"
Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence-An EvolutionaryApproach, 57 Tenn L Rev 577, 580 (1990).
" Other commentators on Dolan have already predicted a substantial jurisprudential
fallout from the decision. See Malcolm M. Murray, Life After Dolan Will it Ever be the
Same?, 24 Colo Law 59, 62 (1995) ("Dolan will fundamentally change the nature of
judicial review of exactions decisions."); Robyn L. Sadler, Note, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Takings Doctrine Remains Vague Under the Rough Proportionality Standard, 31
Willamette L Rev 147, 173 (1995) ("The Court significantly heightened the standards and
criteria for examining land use regulations."); Suzanna Glover-Ettrich, Casenote, A NewlyMinted Hurdle for City Planners: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 28 Creighton L Rev 559, 588
(1995) (noting that "the 'rough proportionality' test departs from the traditional presumption of constitutionality given to legislatures enacting regulations under the police power").
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that the new rough proportionality test imposes on regulatory
exactions. Part I summarizes the Court's pre-Dolan decisions in
the regulatory takings area, focusing particularly on the decline
of property rights in the post-New Deal era and the signs of a
property rights revival in recent decisions. Part II summarizes
the Dolan decision and dissenting opinions. Particularly relevant
is the poor relation dictum, which appears innocuously in the
majority opinion but which potentially hints at a jurisprudential
change of colossal proportions. Part III unpacks the rough proportionality test by examining the alternative tests that the
Court considered and rejected, the cases the Court cited as inspiring its new test, and nontakings cases that have employed a
similar test in analogous circumstances. The Comment concludes
that whatever the Court intends for the future, it did not
significantly raise the level of Takings Clause scrutiny in Dolan.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. Nuisance Theory and the Holmes Formulation
The Supreme Court's regulatory takings analysis has traditionally followed two separate lines of reasoning. The first line
draws on the common law of nuisance and is exemplified by the
early case of Mugler v Kansas.5 In Mugler, a beer brewer challenged a Kansas statute forbidding the brewing of alcoholic beverages as an uncompensated taking of property. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the police power of the state extends to the prohibition of nuisances. 6 The brewing of beer was
a legally cognizable nuisance because of its deleterious effect
upon the public health, morals, and safety, and because Mugler
had no right to create a nuisance, the prohibition of brewing was
not a taking of property. The Mugler nuisance rationale, then,
insulated an entire class of regulatory activity from Fifth Amendment scrutiny simply because it came within the expansive coverage of the state's police power.'7 The Court has continued to apply the nuisance rationale in subsequent cases, 8 although the

- 123 US 623 (1887).
16 Id at 671.

"' For a recent appraisal of the Mugler nuisance doctrine, see Nathaniel S. Lawrence,
Regulatory Takings:Beyond the Balancing Test, 20 Urban Law 389, 394-95 (1988).
" See, for example, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis, 480 US
470, 506 (1987) (upholding state requirement that 50 percent of coal beneath certain
structures be kept in place to prevent public nuisance of collapsing structures); Goldblatt
v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 598 (1962) (upholding against takings challenge
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Supreme Court in one recent case collapsed the nuisance theory
into the general requirement that the state's exercise of its police
power serve a legitimate state interest.' 9
A second line of cases, derived from the landmark decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, ° employs a "diminution in value" rationale. In Mahon, the Court invalidated Pennsylvania's
Kohler Act, which forbade the mining of anthracite coal in such a
way as to cause the subsidence of any human habitation. Writing
for the Court, Justice Holmes rejected the contention that the
mining of coal was a public nuisance, and thus disposed of any
effort to justify the statute under Mugler.2' This conclusion was
not dispositive, however, as Holmes continued in what has become the most famous aphorism of takings law: "The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."22 Because the Kohler Act went "too far," it amounted to an
uncompensated regulatory taking.23
Whether or not a regulation has gone too far under this
analysis is determined in part by the extent to which the regulation diminishes the value of the property.2 4 However, Mahon
itself provides no definitive standards as to how much regulators
may diminish the value of a piece of property without paying

ordinance preventing continued operation of quarry in residential area); Miller v Schoene,
276 US 272, 281 (1928) (upholding against takings challenge right of state to cut down
privately owned trees that acted as hosts to fungus dangerous to apple trees growing in
vicinity); Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 397 (1926) (upholding against
takings challenge municipal ordinance zoning commercial buildings out of plaintiff's
land); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 413-14 (1915) (upholding against takings
challenge law barring operation of brick mill in residential area).
" In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court noted that "'prevention of
harmful use' was merely our early formulation of the police power justification necessary
to sustain (without compensation) any regulatory diminution in value...." 112 S Ct
2886, 2898-99 (1992). However, the Court did not abandon the nuisance theory altogether.
According to the Lucas Court, land uses that would have been common law nuisances in
the "background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance" continue to be
subject to the nuisance abatement theory sanctioned in Mugler. Id at 2888. Thus, Lucas
actually empowers the state to prohibit, without compensation, uses of land that would
have been nuisances at common law. While Lucas may "diminish the number of cases
that are subject to the nuisance exception," James W. Sanderson and Ann Mesmer, A
Review of Regulatory Takings After Lucas, 70 Denver U L Rev 497, 508 (1993), it does not
eliminate the Mugler nuisance theory. For an argument against the use of a nuisance
rationale, see Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L J 36, 48-50 (1964).
2' 260 US 393 (1922).
21 Id at 413.
Id at 415.
Id at 415-16.
24

Id at 413.
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compensation. Thus, the case sets up a vague, ad hoc, and puzzling legal standard.2 5 The development of the "too far" test has
consumed much of the Court's takings efforts in subsequent decisions.26
By formulating an ad hoc balancing approach to regulatory
takings cases,2 Holmes prepared the Takings Clause to follow
in the footsteps of economic substantive due process. In particular, Holmes's open-ended "too far" approach can be viewed as
exposing the Takings Clause to the same proregulatory sentiment that ultimately contributed to the downfall of economic
substantive due process.2 Indeed, Holmes himself expressed
this sentiment seventeen years before Mahon, in his strong dissent in Lochner, the case known as the high point of the Court's
economic substantive due process regime.2 9

' See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle,
57 S Cal L Rev 561, 566 (1984) (noting that courts incant the Holmes formulation "but
actually decide cases on the basis of undisclosed, ad hoc judgments"). Rose notes that
"[m]ore recent commentators have repeated the charge" that the Court's takings decisions
since Mahon have led to an incoherent Takings Clause doctrine. Id at 562 n 6, citing
Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 236 n 9 (Yale 1977), James L.
Oakes, "PropertyRights" in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 Wash L Rev 583, 602-03
(1981), William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 Wash & Lee L
Rev 1057, 1062-63 (1980), and Sandra E. Berchin, Comment, Regulation of Land Use:
From Magna Cartato a Just Formulation,23 UCLA L Rev 904, 912-13 (1976).
26 See Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence,40 Am U L Rev 297, 300 (1990) (noting
that after Mahon, "courts spent most of their energies formulating a variety of tests to
determine the Holmesian point of transition"); Ann T. Kadlecek, Note, The Effect of Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council on the Law of Regulatory Takings, 68 Wash L Rev 415,
418 (1993) ("Throughout the middle of the twentieth century, takings jurisprudence did
not progress beyond, or clarify, the vague 'too far' test of [Mahon].").
27 Mahon itself made it clear that a regulatory takings question "depends upon the
particular facts." 260 US at 413. It has now "become a truism of the Court's takings
jurisprudence that no 'set formula' exists to decide the issue." Lawrence, 20 Urban Law at
398 (cited in note 17). For cases repeating the truism of no set formula, see MacDonald,
Sommer & Fratesv Yolo County, 477 US 340, 348 (1986); PennsylvaniaCentral Transportation Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt, 369 US at 594.
'8 See text accompanying notes 33-36.
198 US at 74-76. Lochner involved a New York statute setting maximum daily and
weekly working hours for bakers. The Court invalidated the statute, finding that it
infringed upon an individual's "general right to make a contract in relation to his business." Id at 53. The Court held that this freedom of contract was protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 64.
Although Lochner involved the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and not the Takings Clause, Holmes's famous statement that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics," id at 75, is cited as a general
indictment of any judicial effort to enshrine laissez-faire, antiregulatory sentiment in any
substantive provision of the Constitution. See, for example, IndustrialUnion Department,
AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 723 (1980) (Marshall dissenting)
(stating that "the Constitution 'does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics'")
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B. Carolene Products and the Post-Lochner Economic Rights
Regime
The advent of the New Deal brought revolutionary changes
to two significant areas of constitutional jurisprudence-economic
liberties and the federal commerce power. The Court began to
abandon its economic substantive due process doctrine around
the same time that it shifted away from an antiregulatory stance
on the Commerce Clause."0 In Nebbia v New York, the Court
sustained against a substantive due process challenge a statute
creating a Milk Control Board to fix maximum and minimum retail prices for milk, stating that "a state is free to adopt whatever
economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote the public
welfare.... . 3 Similarly, in West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish,the
Court held that a Washington statute setting minimum wages for
women likewise did not violate substantive due process."
33 The
The landmark decision arrived in Carolene Products.
Federal Filled Milk Act, which prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of certain kinds of skimmed milk, was challenged
as beyond Congress's Commerce Clause powers, and as a violation of both the Tenth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause. In upholding the Act, the Court adopted a
presumption of constitutionality in favor of legislation enacted
under the police power of the state: such legislation would be
upheld against a substantive due process challenge so long as it
had a "rational basis."34 In footnote 4, one of the most famous
footnotes in the history of constitutional law," the Court made

(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
"' The same year as it decided West Coast Hotel Co. v Parrish,300 US 379 (1937), the
Supreme Court abandoned its narrow reading of the Commerce Clause and began approving federal New Deal legislation. See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 3031 (1937) (upholding power of National Labor Relations Board to issue orders concerning
unfair labor practices under congressional commerce power); NLRB v Fainblatt,306 US
601, 609 (1939) (sustaining reach of National Labor Relations Act to small garment
manufacturer); United States v Darby, 312 US 100, 125 (1941) (sustaining congressional
use of commerce power to regulate child labor).
, 291 US 502, 537 (1934).
300 US 379 (1937). West Coast Hotel overruled a prior economic substantive due
process decision striking down a similar statute. See Adkins v Children'sHospital,261 US
525 (1923).
304 US 144.
Id at 152.
Professor Owen Fiss called footnote 4 "[tlhe great and modern charter for ordering
the relations between judges and other agencies of government.... ." Owen Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 6 (1979).
For a summary of the scholarly superlatives used to describe footnote 4, see Lewis F.
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it clear that the rational basis test applies only to the sort of economic challenges arising in the Lochner line of cases: "There may
be a narrower scope of operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth." 6
Thus, Carolene Products created a two-tiered approach for
judicial analysis of legislation adversely affecting personal freedoms. Legislative enactments affecting economic interests, such
as the freedom of contract and vocation, would be subject to a
highly deferential rational basis test. Statutes infringing upon
specifically enumerated constitutional rights or prejudicing "discrete and insular minorities" would be subject to a higher standard of scrutiny. 7 This bifurcation sounded the death knell for
economic substantive due process38 and has had serious ramifications for the Takings Clause as well.
C. Regulatory Takings Under Low Level Scrutiny
Given that Carolene Products's stricter standard of review
ostensibly extended to all specific constitutional prohibitions, one
might have expected the Takings Clause to have received greater
judicial protection than subsequent cases provided. However, it is
now generally accepted that the Carolene Products line of cases
not only rejected judicial use of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses to canonize laissez-faire economics,
but also resolved to keep the judiciary from interfering with the
growing regulatory state's control over economic activities and
property interests.39 This shift was facilitated in the Takings

Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum L Rev 1087, 1087 n 4 (1982).
CaroleneProducts, 304 US at 152 n 4.
Id at 153 & n 4.
Cases subsequent to CaroleneProducts have made it clear that economic substantive due process is a judicial dead letter. See, for example, Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US
726, 732 (1963); Williamson v Lee Optical Co., 348 US 483, 491 (1955).
The weight of recent scholarship has generally affirmed the proposition that property interests receive minimal scrutiny in the post-New Deal era. See Rose, 57 Tenn L
Rev at 580 (cited in note 13) (arguing that Carolene Products complemented Village of
Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365 (1926), by making property interests "poor
relations in the world of rights"); Norman Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to
Lochner, 17 Sw U L Rev 627, 629 (1988) (explaining that the Court only minimally scrutinizes cases in the property rights area in the wake of West Coast Hotel and Carolene
Products); Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 Am U L Rev 9, 10 (1987) (After the death of substantive due
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Clause context by the open-ended "too far" approach adopted in
Mahon.4 0
The advent of low level scrutiny for Takings Clause cases
virtually crippled the regulatory takings theory. In Pennsylvania
Central Transportation Co. v New York City, the Court upheld
New York's Landmarks Preservation Law, which empowered a
city commission to designate buildings as historical landmarks.4 1 Once a building was so designated, its owner assumed
a legal duty to keep its exterior in good repair and had to secure
commission approval for any exterior alterations." Speaking
through Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the regulation under
a fact-specific, ad hoc balancing approach that focused on three
manipulable factors: first, "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; second, "the extent to which the regulation

process, "[the Court [1 rendered almost impotent even those constitutional clauses most
directly concerned with protecting property, such as the 'takings' clause of the fifth
amendment" and the Contracts Clause.) (citations omitted).
The scholarship on this point, however, has not been unanimous. Judge Learned
Hand suggested that it would be too hasty to conclude that the Nebbia line of cases
precludes "any judicial review of a statute [affecting only economic interests] because the
choice made between the values and sacrifices in question did not commend itself to the
court's notions of justice." Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 45 (Harvard 1958). Professor
Louis Lusky, who was Chief Justice Stone's law clerk at the time of the CaroleneProducts
decision, calls a "misconception... the notion that the Footnote calls for a denial of strict
scrutiny in all cases involving property rights or economic interests." Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum L Rev 1093, 1105 (1982).
" Interestingly, in Dolan, Justice Stevens made the opposite point in criticizing the
regulatory takings doctrine. 114 S Ct at 2327 (Stevens dissenting). Stevens compared
Holmes's approach in Mahon to the majority opinion in Lochner, stating "both doctrines
are potentially open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair." Id. While it is certainly true
that the "too far" approach is highly discretionary and likely subject to the biases and
opinions of members of the Court, the test does not necessarily predict the direction that
such biases and opinions will cut. In this regard, one commentator has characterized the
"too far" test "as nothing more than the due process test of reasonableness .... " Janice C.
Griffith, Local Government Contracts:Escapingfrom the Governmental/ProprietaryMaze,
75 Iowa L Rev 277, 341 n 297 (1990).
While a Court ideologically opposed to economic regulation could easily dismiss land
use regulations as "unreasonable," a Court sympathetic to regulation could just as easily
accept regulations as reasonable without undertaking any searching legal inquiry. Indeed,
the latter appears to have been the Court's predominant pattern under the "too far" approach until the last few years. See note 10 and accompanying text. If the Court had been
using a bright line test-for example, that a nonnuisance land use restriction leading to a
diminution in value entitled the owner to compensation-it would have been forced to find
more regulatory takings than it did. Therefore, the combination of rational basis review,
with its underlying presumption of constitutionality, and the Mahon "too far" approach,
generally advances a proregulatory jurisprudence.
41 438 US 104, 138 (1978).
" Id at 111-12.
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has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and
third, "the character of the governmental action."43 Many commentators believe that Pennsylvania Central represents the nadir
of Takings Clause scrutiny in the post-Carolene Products
world."
D. The 1986 Term: Death and Resurrection of Regulatory
Takings
The Supreme Court's 1986 term brought three important
Takings Clause decisions.' Any one of them, decided on its own,
surely would have led to speculation regarding the constitutional
position of the Takings Clause. Taken together, the three cases
created a deluge of commentary and criticism.46 The first decision, Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis,47
revisited the Mahon question through the lens of Pennsylvania
Central," and therefore marked just one more step in the low
level scrutiny line of cases. Confronted with a Pennsylvania Mine
Subsidence Act virtually identical to the one invalidated in
Mahon,49 the Court parted company with Justice Holmes. Although the Court attempted to distinguish Mahon on two
counts," its validation of the Subsidence Act conflicted directly
Id at 124 (citations omitted).
See Richard A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes
Again, 26 Loyola LA L Rev 3, 15 (1992) (criticizing the Pennsylvania Central approach to
regulatory takings as the "lowest imaginable standard of scrutiny"); Richard G. Wilkins,
The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old ConstitutionalTale, 64 Notre Dame L Rev
1, 28 (1989) (stating that Pennsylvania Central'sreading of Mugler "virtually repeals the
takings clause").
' Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis,480 US 470 (1987); Nollan v
California Coastal Commission, 483 US 825 (1987); FirstEnglish Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304 (1987).
" Nollan, Keystone, and FirstEnglish have generated over thirty-five law review articles, notes, and comments. See, for example, Charles H. Clarke, The Owl and the Takings
Clause, 25 St Mary's L J 693 (1994); Susan J. Krueger, Comment, Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis: Toward Redefining Takings Law, 64 NYU L Rev 877
(1989); Anne R. Pramaggiore, Comment, The Supreme Court's Trilogy of Regulatory
Takings: Keystone, Glendale and Nollan, 38 DePaul L Rev 441 (1989).
47

480 US 470 (1987).

" See Pramaggiore, Comment, 38 DePaul L Rev at 472-75 (cited in note 46) (arguing
that Keystone applied takings analysis employed in Pennsylvania Central, which resulted
in substantial deference to legislature).
4' The Subsidence Act required that 50 percent of the coal beneath certain structures
be kept in place to provide surface support. Keystone, 480 US at 477.
' First, unlike the Kohler Act, which merely balanced private economic interests, the
Subsidence Act included specific findings by the Pennsylvania legislature that the Subsidence Act would serve the common welfare of the general public. Id at 485. Second,
unlike in Mahon, there was no record finding that "the Subsidence Act makes it impossi-
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with Mahon, leading many commentators to assert that the prior
case had been overruled sub silentio.5 ' Additionally, the decision
cast serious doubt on the viability of facial challenges to land use
regulations.5 2 From the first takings decision of the 1986 term,
then, one might have imagined that regulatory takings theories
had gone the way of economic substantive due process and the
dodo bird. One would have been wrong.
Although Keystone appeared to signal the end of Mahon, two
cases decided later in the 1986 term revealed that the regulatory
takings theory was still very much alive. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County of Los Angeles, the
Court held that when regulations "take" a landowner's property
temporarily, the government must pay compensation for the
value of the property for the duration of the taking.5 3 On the
one hand, First English adds little to the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence because it does not define "taking" and focuses
solely on the question of remedies.5 4 On the other hand, the decision stands as a significant deterrent to municipal experimentation with land use schemes that could be declared takings.5 5
Thus, while First English does not in itself strengthen the regulatory takings theory, it does create a strong disincentive for
government entities to regulate land use in constitutionally questionable ways.
The third relevant case in the 1986 term introduced a new
twist to the regulatory takings doctrine, and brought the Takings
Clause back onto center stage. In Nollan v California Coastal

ble for [the landowners] to profitably engage in their business, or that there has been
undue interference with their investment-backed expectations." Id.
" See, for example, Clarke, 25 St Mary's L J at 714 (cited in note 46) (concluding
that Mahon did not survive Keystone's rejection of constitutional laissez-faire); Michael M.
Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution:The Supreme Court EstablishesNew Ground Rules
for Land-Use Planning, 20 Urban Law 735, 739 (1988) ("The Keystone majority could not
bring itself to overrule Pennsylvania Coal, so it tried to belittle it."); Robert H. Freilich,
State and Local Government at the Crossroads:A Bitterly Divided Supreme Court Reevaluates Federalism in the Bicentennial Year of the Constitution, 19 Urban Law 791, 797
(1987) (arguing that Keystone distinguishes itself from Mahon on the basis of benefit to
the public at large). But see Krueger, Comment, 64 NYU L Rev at 908 (cited in note 46)
(concluding that Keystone does not overrule Mahon sub silentio).
" See Susan Manges McMichael, Note, Mahon Revisited: Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), 29 Nat Resources J 1067, 1077 (1989); Derek
Guemmer, Casenote, Constitutional Law: Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis: PennsylvaniaCoal Revisited, 56 UMKC L Rev 153, 154 (1987).
" 482 US 304, 322 (1987).
" See Acton, 17 Stetson L Rev at 744 (cited in note 4).
For a discussion of the chilling effect of the FirstEnglish decision on land use planning, see The Supreme Court, 1986 Term Leading Cases, 101 Harv L Rev 119, 246 (1987).
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Commission, the Nollans applied for a coastal development permit to demolish their existing beachfront bungalow and to replace it with a three-bedroom house.5 6 Finding that the construction of the new house would obstruct the public's view of the
seashore, the California Coastal Commission conditioned approval of the building permit on the Nollans granting a lateral public
easement over the beach portion of their property.5 7 The Supreme Court held that even though the Commission could have
denied the building permit altogether, it could not condition the
grant of the permit on a concession by the property owners that
lacked an "essential nexus" to the justification for the prohibition.58 Because allowing members of the public already on the
beach to walk along the Nollans' land would in no way address
the barrier to visual access created by the new house, the
Commission's attempted exaction was a taking without just compensation.59 As later explained in Dolan, "[t]he absence of a nexus left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to
obtain an easement through gimmickry, which converted
a valid
50
regulation of use into 'an out-and-out plan of extortion."'
In dissent, Justice Brennan chided the majority for abandoning the rational basis test for the Takings Clause.6 ' Justice
Scalia responded, in footnote 3 of the majority opinion, by arguing that even though Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead6' assumed
that the rational basis test applied to the Takings Clause, "that

483 US 825, 828 (1987).
Id.
Id at 837.
In Nollan, the Court applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the
Takings Clause context. The doctrine was well explained later in Dolan: "Under the wellsettled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person
to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when the
property is taken for public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the
government where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit." 114 S
Ct at 2317, citing Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972), and Pickering v Board of
Education, 391 US 563, 586 (1968). For further commentary on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine is an Anachronism (With ParticularReference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion),
70 BU L Rev 593 (1990); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 Harv L
Rev 1415 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987-Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv L Rev 4 (1988);
Robert L. Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 Colum L Rev
321 (1935).
' 114 S Ct at 2317, citing Nollan, 483 US at 837, quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v
Town of Atkinson, 121 NH 581, 432 A2d 12, 14-15 (1981). J.E.D. has since been overruled
by Town ofAuburn v McEvoy, 131 NH 383, 553 A2d 317 (1988).
, Nollan, 483 US at 843-45 (Brennan dissenting).
369 US 590 (1962).
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assumption is inconsistent with the formulations of... later
cases." 63 According to Scalia, the proper test for regulatory takings is whether the regulations "'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest. ' "64
The majority's explicit rejection of the rational basis test
provoked several law review comparisons between Nollan and
Carolene Products. One commentator compared footnote 4 of
Carolene Products to footnote 3 of Nollan.65 Another scholar suggested that Nollan almost rehabilitates property rights after
Carolene Products.66 Professor Norman Karlin speculated that
Nollan and First English together may usher in a "new era in
constitutional law decision making" to replace the Carolene Products regime.6 7 Other commentators debated the level of scrutiny
imposed in Nollan, generally agreeing that it reflected either
intermediate or strict scrutiny. 8 Most commentators agreed
that the decision would make land use regulation considerably
more difficult.69
Despite the nearly unanimous agreement immediately after
Nollan that the decision worked profound changes in regulatory

Nollan, 483 US at 835 n 3.
Id, quotingAgins v City of Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260-62 (1980).
Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The
RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part1), 23 Urban Law 301, 309 (1991).
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 S Ct Rev 1, 38 (1987).
Karlin, 17 Sw U L Rev at 627 (cited in note 39). See also Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Legal Discourse, Social Vision and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The
Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59
U Colo L Rev 427, 473 (1988) (citing emergence of Nollan and First English as a "significant historical juncture" in Supreme Court discourse rivaled only by the New Deal and
the Civil Rights movement).
' See Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L Rev 1600, 1607-08 (1988)
(arguing that Nollan endorses semistrict judicial scrutiny); William A. Falik and Anna C.
Shimko, The Takings Nexus: The Supreme Court Forges a New Direction in Land-Use
Jurisprudence, 23 Real Prop, Prob & Tr J 1, 37 (1988) (stating that Nollan's test is
reminiscent of the strict scrutiny developed for the Equal Protection Clause);
Pramaggiore, Comment, 38 DePaul L Rev at 481 (cited in note 46) (reasoning that Nollan
should be understood as an intermediate scrutiny case). But see Judith E. Caliman, Note,
Private Rights v. Public Needs: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 1987 Detroit
Col L Rev 1201, 1215 (concluding that Nollan announces no new rule of law and has no
significance beyond its facts).
" See, for example, Mary M. Cizerle, Casenote, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: Unprecedented Intrusion Upon a State's Judgment of the ProperMeans to be Applied
in Land Use Regulation, 21 John Marshall L Rev 641, 648 (1988) (characterizing Nollan
as an unworkably rigid rule); Rigoberto V. Obregon and Rebekah L. Parker, Comment,
'Get it Right the First Time' A Message From the United States Supreme Court to Land
Use and Environmental Regulators-A Comment on Nollan and First English, 7 UCLA J
Envir L & Policy 173, 177-78 (1988) (arguing that Nollan not only heightens scrutiny on
regulators, but also shifts the burden of proof onto them).
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takings doctrine, most recent commentary generally asserts that
the decision has had little effect on lower courts' analyses of land
use regulations." If the Supreme Court intended to heighten
scrutiny on the Takings Clause, the lower courts either misapprehended or disobeyed its directive. Moreover, Nollan left open the
large question of what level of scrutiny the Supreme Court would
apply to regulatory takings in future decisions.7 Enter Dolan.

" See Sandra Bailey, Comment, Land Use Regulations and the Takings Clause:Are
Courts Applying a Tougher Standardto RegulatorsAfter Nollan?, 32 Nat Resources J 959,
965-66 (1992) (observing that despite dire predictions regarding Nollan, very few courts
have actually applied a stricter standard of review); Elene Kapp, Comment, Government
Land Use Regulations Affecting Private Property: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny After
Nollan?, 18 W State U L Rev 357, 373 (1990) (pointing out that in the three years following Nollan there have been no heightened scrutiny progeny in the lower courts); Steven J.
Lemon, Sandy R. Feinland, and Colin C. Deihl, Comment, The First Applications of the
Nollan Nexus Test: Observations and Comments, 13 Harv Envir L Rev 585, 597 (1989)
(concluding lower courts have not applied Nollan as a heightened scrutiny test); Phillip S.
Simmons, Note, Commercial Builders Revisits Nolla- Constitutional Taking and the
Limits of Regulatory Exactions, 13 Whittier L Rev 937, 937 (1992) (reasoning that Ninth
Circuit opinion reflects view that Nollan scrutiny is less strict than many believed). But
see Michael M. Berger, Late-Breaking News About Takings Law, C709 ALI-ABA 19, 27
(1992) (noting most cases since Nollan have applied strict scrutiny). See also John A.
Saurenman, Keystone, Nollan and First English Three Years Later: How Fare the States?,
3 Emerging Issues St Const L 115, 150 (1990) (arguing that no clear pattern of dealing
with the Nollan nexus test emerges from the state court decisions).
" The one major takings decision between Nollan and Dolan, Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S Ct 2886 (1992), involved a unique factual scenario, and therefore
may be unimportant to the future of takings law. In Lucas, the Court held that a regulation depriving a property owner of all economically viable use of his land amounted to
a per se taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id at 2901-02. While dicta in
the majority opinion may provide some clues as to the Court's intentions in the regulatory
takings arena, the unreviewable lower court findings that the prohibition on improvements eliminated 100 percent of the value of Lucas's land are so unusual that Lucas may
be a lightning bolt, unlikely to strike again and irrelevant to the future of takings law.
See E. Paige Spencer, Note, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciL- A Narrow Exception
to the Takings Clause, 3 Widener J Pub L 639, 706 (1993) (speculating that the 100
percent rule may never be tested because of the unique facts of Lucas).
On the other hand, Lucas should not be completely ignored "in view of the powerful
recent momentum in reconfiguration of the Takings Clause." William C. Leigh and Bruce
W. Burton, Predatory Governmental Zoning Practices and the Supreme Court's New
Takings Clause Formulation:Timing, Value, and R.I.B.E., 1993 BYU L Rev 827, 847. For
purposes of this Comment, though, it is sufficient to note that the Lucas holding was
narrow, but that in light of its temporal proximity to Nollan, FirstEnglish, and Dolan, it
could arguably be viewed as one more way station on the road to heightened Takings
Clause scrutiny.
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II. THE DOLAN DECISION
A. The Facts
Like Nollan, Dolan involved a municipality that conditioned
the grant of a land improvement permit on the dedication of a
portion of the property to public use.72 Pursuant to a state land
use planning statute, 3 the city of Tigard, Oregon identified traffic congestion in its central business district as a problem and
adopted a plan for a pedestrian/bicycle pathway to encourage the
use of alternatives to automobile transportation. In addition to
traffic congestion, Tigard had also experienced flooding in its
Fanno Creek. The city therefore adopted a drainage plan, which
called for the preservation of a greenway along the floodplain and
the construction of various improvements to minimize flooding
problems.7 4
Florence Dolan owns a plumbing and electric supply store on
a 1.67-acre parcel in the central business district of Tigard. Hoping to redevelop the site, she applied for a permit nearly to double the size of the store and to pave a thirty-nine-space parking
lot. In considering her application, the City Planning Commission
found it "reasonable to assume that customers and employees of
the future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation and
recreational needs."75 In the Commission's opinion, this pathway
"could offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby] streets and
lessen the increase in traffic congestion."76 The Commission also
found that the addition of the paved parking lot, an impervious
surface, would increase stormwater flow into the already strained
Fanno Creek.7 7 Based on these findings, the Commission approved Dolan's building permit on the conditions that she dedicate the portion of her property lying within the creek's
floodplain to be used as a public greenway and that she dedicate
an additional fifteen-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain
to the city for use as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.7 8

r Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2312.
7 Or Rev Stat §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991).
7 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2313.
Id at 2314-15, quoting City of Tigard Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09
PC, App to Pet for Cert G24.
"' Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2315.
77 Id.

7"Id.
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Dolan challenged these exactions as uncompensated regulatory takings, but lost before the Land Use Board of Appeals, the
Oregon Court of Appeals, and the Oregon Supreme Court.79 The
Oregon Supreme Court interpreted Nollan as holding that an
"exaction is reasonably related to an impact if the exaction serves
the same purpose that a denial of the permit would serve." 0
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.8
B. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
joined. Rehnquist addressed the question left open by Nollan:
"What is the required degree of connection between exactions
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development."8 3 After summarizing the facts of the case and the
holdings of some frequently cited takings decisions, Rehnquist
described the relationship between Nollan and Dolan. The first
question to be addressed in exactions cases is "whether the 'essential nexus' exists between the 'legitimate state interest' and
the permit condition exacted by the city."' In Nollan, Rehnquist
explained, the Court found no such nexus, and therefore did not
have to proceed to the second question, which he framed as "the
required degree of connection between the exactions and the
projected impact of the proposed development."8 5
In Dolan, the Court had no difficulty finding an essential
nexus between the city's exactions and the reduction of traffic
congestion and flooding.86 However, the Court had never enunciated a precise standard to govern the second prong of the exactions test: the required impact/exaction relationship. For guidance, the majority looked to state precedent addressing that
precise question.
The majority broke the state cases down into three groups.
First, New York and Montana had adopted "very generalized

7 Id at 2315-16.
Dolan v City of Tigard, 317 Or 110, 854 P2d 437, 443 (1993), rev'd, 114 S Ct 2309
(1994).
81 Dolan v City of Tigard, 114 S Ct 544, 544 (1993).
Dolan, 114 S Ct 2309.
" Id at 2312.
Id at 2317, quoting Nollan, 483 US at 837.
Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2317.
Id at 2317-18.
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statements as to the necessary connection between the required
dedication and the proposed development... ."" The majority
held that this standard was "too lax to adequately protect" property interests." A second group of states had followed the lead
of the Illinois Supreme Court and adopted a "specifi[c] and
uniquely attributable" test.89 Under this approach, "if the local
government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need," the exaction becomes a
taking.9" The Court rejected this standard also, stating that
"given the nature of the interests involved," the Constitution does
not require "such exacting scrutiny."91
Having rejected both permissive and strict approaches, the
Court homed in on an "intermediate position, requiring the municipality to show a 'reasonable relationship' between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed development."9 2 A number of state courts and one federal circuit had
already adopted this position. 3 The Court expressed its view
that "the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted by a majority of
the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than
either of those previously discussed."94 However, the Court declined to "adopt it as such, partly because the term 'reasonable
relationship' seems confusingly similar to the term 'rational
basis' which describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."95 Instead, the Court described the requirement of the Fifth Amendment as one of "rough proportionality." The Court explained this
test: "No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the
city must make some sort of individualized determination that

Id at 2318-19, citing Billings Properties,Inc. v Yellowstohie County, 144 Mont 25,
394 P2d 182 (1964), and Jenad, Inc. v Village of Scarsdale, 18 NY2d 78, 271 NYS2d 955
(1966).
Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2319.
Id.
e Id.
"

Id.

92

Id.

"3 Id, citing Simpson v City of North Platte, 206 Neb 240, 292 NW2d 297, 301 (1980),
Jordan v Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis 2d 608, 137 NW2d 442 (1965), Collis v City
of Bloomington, 310 Minn 5, 246 NW2d 19, 23-24 (1976), City of College Station v Turtle
Rock Corp, 680 SW2d 802, 807 (Tex 1984), Call v City of West Jordan, 606 P2d 217, 220
(Utah 1979), and Parks v Watson, 716 F2d 646, 651-53 (9th Cir 1983).
Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2319.

" Id. The Court might have added:
dissenting position in Nollan."

...

and confusingly similar to Justice Brennan's
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the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development."96
Applying this test to the facts before it, the Court concluded
that neither the exaction of the bicycle/pedestrian pathway nor
the exaction of the greenway was roughly proportional to the
projected impact of Dolan's proposed development.97 As to the
greenway, the city's insistence upon public ownership constituted
the Fifth Amendment defect. The Court would have found no
constitutional infirmity with a requirement that Dolan leave the
floodplain undeveloped. However, "[t]he city [had] never said why
a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in
the interest of flood control."" Tigard had demanded one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights-the right
to exclude others-even though the paved parking lot would not
create a need for a publicly owned greenway.
As to the pathway, the fatal error appeared to lie in the
indeterminate nature of the Commission's findings. "The city
simply found that the creation of the pathway 'could offset some
of the traffic demand ...and lessen the increase in traffic con-

gestion."'99 The Court quoted Oregon Supreme Court Justice
Peterson's dissenting opinion below: "The findings of fact that the
bicycle pathway system 'could offset some of the traffic demand'
is a far cry from a finding that the bicycle pathway system will,
or is likely to, offset some of the traffic demand."' According to
the majority, under the rough proportionality test, the city bore
the burden "to quantify its findings in support of the dedication,"' a burden of proof that it failed to meet.
C. The Dissenters
Two dissenting opinions were filed in Dolan. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg, began by criticizing
the majority for purporting to rely on state cases that invalidated
ordinances on the basis of state law "or unspecified grounds
roughly equivalent to Nollan's 'essential nexus' requirement."0 2
The opinion further chided the majority for overriding a rational

9
"
98

100

Id at 2319-20.
Id at 2321-22.
Id at 2320.
Id at 2321-22.
Id at 2322, quoting Dolan v City of Tigard, 317 Or 110, 854 P2d 437, 447 (1993)

(Peterson dissenting).
101 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2322.
102 Id at 2323 (Stevens dissenting).
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and impartial land planning scheme by narrowly focusing on a
single stick from the bundle of property rights. Most significantly,
Stevens criticized the majority for departing from the traditional
presumption of constitutionality by resurrecting "a species of
substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades
ago."' In conclusion, the opinion emphasized that the burden
of proving that a regulatory taking occurred belongs with the
landowner."'
Justice Souter sounded a less severe tone in his dissent.
Souter's opinion began by stating that the majority announced a
test that it did not apply." 5 Souter would have resolved the entire issue under Nollan, and stated that he would have found the
required rational connection between the exactions and the governmental interest."6 Souter disagreed with the majority most
on whether the burden of proof should rest with the landowner or
the municipality. Souter would have left the burden on the landowner under "the usual rule in cases involving the police power
that the government is presumed to have acted constitutionally."'
D. The "Poor Relation" Dictum
Whatever the effect of the rough proportionality test on regulatory exactions, Dolan's dictum ultimately may exercise more
influence than its holding. Just after it announced the rough
proportionality test, and before it applied that test, the majority
took a brief aside to rebut a criticism raised in Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion. Stevens maintained that the city's exactions
were "a species of business regulation that heretofore warranted
a strong presumption of constitutional validity."' The majority
responded that "simply denominating a governmental measure as
a 'business regulation' does not immunize it from constitutional
challenge on the grounds that it violates a provision of the Bill of
Rights.""°9 In this regard, the majority noted that precedents
under the First and Fourth Amendments indicated that commercial or business entities could also claim constitutional protec-

,

Id at 2326, citing Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726 (1963).
Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2330 (Stevens dissenting).
105 Id at 2330 (Souter dissenting).
10 Id at 2331.
107 Id, citing Goldblatt v Town of Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594-96 (1962), and United
10

States v Sperry Corp, 493 US 52, 60 (1989).
10 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2325 (Stevens dissenting).
10 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2320.
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tion." ° Then, in the middle of this otherwise innocuous paragraph, Rehnquist dropped a potential bombshell: "We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation
in these comparable circumstances.""' Having made this pronouncement, the majority opinion proceeded to apply the rough
proportionality test to the facts of Dolan."
The poor relation comment, as dictum, is subject to different
interpretations. One could dismiss it as a mere response to an
antagonistic position raised by the dissent. However, if footnote 3
of Nollan, which rejected the rational basis test for Takings
Clause cases," raised a hue and cry among Court watchers,
the poor relation dictum should do still more. Even prior to
Dolan, Professor Carol Rose had observed that CaroleneProducts
made property interests "poor relations in the world of rights," foreshadowing the very words employed in Dolan." If the Court
meant to do no more with its poor relation comment than rebut
Stevens's commercial regulation argument, it unwittingly opened
Pandora's box.
To commentators awaiting hints of the Court's regulatory
takings direction after Nollan and Lucas, the poor relation dictum certainly will sound like a repudiation of Carolene Products.
Taken at face value, the comment suggests that the entire
post-New Deal bifurcation of economic regulations and personal
liberties rests on shaky ground. If the Court were to begin treating property rights with the same respect it accords speech and
privacy interests, Carolene Products and its progeny would be
relegated to the dustbin of judicial history."'

"' The majority relied principally upon Marshall v Barlow's, Inc., 436 US 307, 324
(1978) (invalidating statute authorizing warrantless searches of business premises on
Fourth Amendment grounds), and Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp v Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 US 557, 571-72 (1980) (holding Commission's order prohibiting advertising
by a utility company to promote use of electricity violates First Amendment).
...Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2320.
112

See id at 2320-22.

"' See note 65-69 and accompanying text.
114 Rose, 57 Tenn L Rev at 580 (cited in note 13). Within the same set of familial
metaphors, property interests in the post-New Deal era have been characterized as a
"red-headed stepchild," David H. Safavian, Comment, Re-Taking the Fifth Amendment-PropertyRights Revisited, 1993 Detroit Coil L Rev 955, 955 (1993), and as an "ugly
duckling," Schwartz, 37 Am U L Rev at 9 (cited in note 39).
' Professor Epstein has advocated that the Court carry over its First Amendment
analysis to the Takings Clause. Richard A. Epstein, Property,Speech, and the Politics of
Distrust, 59 U Chi L Rev 41, 42-43 (1992). Such a paradigm shift would rest upon the
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The death of CaroleneProductswould be an event of tremendous significance.16 Spillover effects from a vigorous implementation of the poor relation dictum would flow well beyond the
Takings Clause. Already, commentators have suggested that
Nollan may have set the Court up to use the Equal Protection
Clause more actively in land regulation situations." 7 Similarly,
there have been calls for a return to economic substantive due
process"' and a heightening of Privileges and Immunities
Clause scrutiny" in relation to land use regulation. If the
post-CaroleneProducts dual system of strict and minimal scrutiny were to be abolished, other economically oriented provisions of
the Constitution, such as the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clauses, might be reinvigorated significantly. In short, a

belief that "the dominant mode of thinking about property rights during the past fifty
years has been a mistake of constitutional dimensions." Id at 41. By implication, if the
Court were to treat the Takings Clause in par! materia with the First Amendment, it
would have to rewrite the bulk of its post-New Deal takings jurisprudence. In a similar
vein, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence illustrates the shift from "the early twentiethcentury Court's veneration of property as the central constitutional value," to "the midtwentieth-century Court's relative indifference to property interests .... " William C.
Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth Amendment, 60 Brooklyn L Rev 633, 688
(1994). After Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967), "and the numerous cases that
flowed from it," the Fourth Amendment seemed to protect "property interests only to the
extent that it protect[ed] privacy interests." Heffernan, 60 Brooklyn L Rev at 634. "[The
contemporary Court's cautious rehabilitation of property as a constitutionally protected
interest" within the Fourth Amendment, id at 688, coincides with its "interest in elevating
property rights above the lowly status into which they had fallen following the crisis of
legitimacy the Court suffered in the late 1930s," id at 651 (citing Dolan poor relation
dictum). Thus, the Carolene Products regime undermined even the property interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment, a constitutional provision subjected to increasingly
heightened scrutiny in the following constitutional generation. Taken as a reaffirmation of
all constitutional property interests, the poor relation dictum suggests that this regime
should be reconsidered.
1 According to Professor Brilmayer, Carolene Products is no longer a case, but
instead "a line of reasoning, and one so venerable as to have achieved almost axiomatic
status in a world where virtually every other proposition of Constitutional law is best considered controversial." Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "InsideOutsider", 134 U Pa L Rev 1291, 1291 (1986).
"' William A. Falik and Anna C. Shimko, The "Takings"Nexus-The Supreme Court
Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning:A View from California,39 Hastings L J
359, 391 (1988).
"' Randall T. Shepard, Land Use Regulation in the Rehnquist Court: The Fifth
Amendment and JudicialIntervention, 38 Cath U L Rev 847, 847 (1989). See also Ross A.
Macfarlane, Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations:
Substantive Due Process as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 Wash L Rev
715, 733, 743 (1982) (arguing that substantive due process offers greater flexibility than
the Takings Clause, and is therefore a superior tool for assessing the constitutionality of
land use regulations).
"' Keith R. Denny, Note, That Old Due Process Magic: Growth Control and the
Federal Constitution, 88 Mich L Rev 1245, 1247 (1990).
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broad reading of the poor relation dictum would suggest that the
Court is poised to jettison a paradigm that has governed a large
part of20its constitutional jurisprudence for the better part of sixty
years.

III. UNPACKING THE ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY TEST

The poor relation dictum may or may not signal an end to
the Carolene Products regime, but the answer to that question
does not lie within the four corners of the Dolan opinion. Just as
it would have been impossible to predict the tremendous influence of footnote 4 of CaroleneProducts from a dissection of that
opinion,"2 so it is impossible to tell just how far the Court will
take its Dolan dictum. Dolan was a five-to-four decision, and
whether it represents a harbinger of a new single-level scrutiny
for all substantive protections of the Constitution will depend on
the personalities and dynamics at work on the Supreme Court.
Given the gargantuan implications of the poor relation dictum,
far-reaching speculation regarding the future of the Carolene
Products regime is tempting. However, many lower court decisions failed to bear out similar dramatic pronouncements in the
aftermath of Nollan.2 Therefore, the recent history of Takings
Clause jurisprudence demands restraint in forecasting Dolan's
domain.
While sweeping predictions are speculative at best, the Court
did not leave the legal community wholly without means to begin
assessing the impact of the Dolan dictum. In formulating the
new rough proportionality test, the Court gave commentators a
mechanism by which to interpret its dictum. Presumably, if the
The death of Carolene Productsmight also have implications for the Court's treatment of the Commerce Clause. It was no accident of history that West Coast Hotel, 300
US 379 (upholding statute setting minimum wages for women against due process challenge), was decided in the same year as NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1
(1937) (watershed case expanding Commerce Clause to accommodate New Deal programs). Insofar as a proregulatory jurisprudence included both aggrandizement of enumerated federal powers and a cutback on individual freedom of contract and private
property rights, it is reasonable to expect that a reversion to a pro-property rights jurisprudence could signal correlative limitations on the congressional commerce power.
This prediction is supported by the Court's recent decision in United States v Lopez, 115 S
Ct 1624 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 as exceeding Congress's
Commerce Clause authority).
121 See Powell, 82 Coluin L Rev at 1090 (cited in note 35) (Justice Stone was using the
cryptic language of footnote 4 to "spark debate over ideas that he had not developed fully"
and not to outline "a comprehensive theory of constitutional adjudication."), citing Alpheus
Mason, HarlanFiske Stone: Pillarof the Law 513 (Viking 1956).
120

1

See note 70 and accompanying text.
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majority wanted the poor relation dictum to signal its dissatisfac-

tion with the jurisprudential status quo, its test would apply a
higher standard of scrutiny. Conversely, if the rough proportionality test does not depart significantly from past practice, the
poor relation dictum may seem less promising to property rights
activists and less ominous to regulators. In any event, analysis of
the rough proportionality test, as applied by the Dolan Court, can
help make sense of the poor relation dictum.
Three areas of inquiry suggest that the rough proportionality
test does not significantly elevate the level of scrutiny on regulatory exactions. First, the state court standards that the Court
considered and rejected offer clues as to what the rough proportionality test is not. Second, the six cases employing a reasonable
relationship test, which the Court cited as being "closer to the
federal constitutional norm,""' offer clues as to the kind of
scrutiny to be imposed by the rough proportionality test. Finally,
it is possible to locate similar tests in nontakings cases, and to
analyze the level of scrutiny that they impose on claimed violations of other provisions of the Constitution.
A. The Standards Rejected
As previously noted, the Dolan Court examined three sets of
state court standards in arriving at the rough proportionality
test. This Section briefly addresses the two roads not taken: the
"'specifically and uniquely attributable'" test and the unnamed
"generalized statements.""4 The Court's rejection of the latter
approach is altogether unsurprising, given that it conflicted openly with Nollan. Jenad, Inc. v Village of Scarsdale' and Billings Properties,Inc. v Yellowstone County,"' the two state court
decisions cited for this approach, imposed no greater scrutiny on
exactions than the infinitely malleable reasonableness standard
that always applies to evaluations of the police power. 7 Neither case made any effort to link the development impact and the
exaction, whether qualitatively, as required by Nollan, or even
quantitatively, as ultimately required by Dolan. In this regard,
the reasonableness standard differs little from the rational basis
test explicitly rejected in Nollan."' Thus, the Dolan Court's dis"'

Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2319.

124 Id
'
'2'
'
12A

at 2318-19.

18 NY2d 78, 271 NYS2d 955 (1966).
144 Mont 25, 394 P2d 182 (1964).
Jenad,271 NYS2d at 958-59; Billings Properties, 394 P2d at 186.
See Simmons, Note, 13 Whittier L Rev at 940 n 17 (cited in note 70) (arguing the
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approval of the approach embodied in Jenad's and Billings
Properties's"generalized statements" offers scant information on
the constitutional position of the Takings Clause.
If the Court's rejection of Jenad and Billings Propertiessays
little, its rejection of the "specifically and uniquely attributable"
test says much. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v Village of
Mount Prospect,'29 the source of this test, represents the
paradigmatic enunciation of a strict scrutiny standard in the
exactions context."' 0 The test requires a very tight fit between
the exaction and the development impact: "[Ihf the burden cast
upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to
his activity, then the requirement is permissible; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to a confiscation of private property.... ."' Those courts that have adopted this standard have
used it "primarily to shield developers from demands for schools
and parklands, and related in lieu fees."" 2
In rejecting the Pioneer Trust test, the Dolan Court passed
up a golden opportunity to substantiate its poor relation dictum.
The "specifically and uniquely attributable" standard has the
flavor of the strict scrutiny tests that surround the preferred
freedoms of the Bill of Rights.'33 If the Court intended to break
rational basis test is a reasonableness standard). See also Nollan, 483 US at 844 n 1
(Brennan dissenting) (Although the phraseology may differ from case to case, the inquiry
in each case is the same.).
'2 22 Ill
2d 375, 176 NE2d 799 (1961).
1" Pioneer Trusts "specifically and uniquely attributable" test has been generally
recognized as imposing a strict standard on regulatory exactions. See, for example,
Thomas W. Ledman, Note, Local Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, the Next Generation,45 U Fla L Rev 835, 844 (1993) (stating test imposes
"a very strict judicial standard"); Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 Iowa L Rev 1011, 1049 (1991) (characterizing test as
a "strict standard"); S. Mark White, Development Fees and Exemptions for Affordable
Housing: Tailoring Regulations to Achieve Multiple Public Objectives, 6 J Land Use &
Envir L 25, 26 n 7 (1990) (referring to test as a "strict causation-benefit standard"); John
J. Delaney, Larry A. Gordon, and Kathryn J. Hess, The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified
Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 L &
Contemp Probs 139, 149 (1987) (stating test is "very stringent").
131 Pioneer Trust, 176 NE2d at 802.
"
Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning,
Development Agreements, and the TheoreticalFoundationsof Government Land Use Deals,
65 NC L Rev 957, 1017-18 (1987). Of the four cases other than Pioneer Trust that Dolan
cited as employing the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test, three invalidated the
exactions in question, J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v Town of Atkinson, 121 NH 581, 432 A2d
12, 15 (1981); McKain v Toledo City Plan Commission, 26 Ohio App 2d 171, 270 NE2d
370, 374-75 (1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v City of Cranston, 107 RI 63, 264 A2d 910, 91314 (1970), and one was remanded for further factual determinations, Divan Builders, Inc.
v PlanningBoard, 66 NJ 582, 334 A2d 30, 41 (1975).
1" More precisely, the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test resembles the
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with Carolene Products and elevate the Takings Clause to full
equality with its constitutional cousins, it would logically have
chosen the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test over the
rough proportionality test. Instead, its choice of a permutation of
the reasonable relationship standard suggests that property interests remain subject to far-reaching regulation through exactions.
B. Cases Inspiring the Rough
"Reasonable Relationship" Test

Proportionality

Test:

The

Strictly speaking, the Court did not officially adopt the reasonable relationship test that was "closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously discussed."" Indeed, it rejected the reasonable relationship terminology partly
because of its semantic similarity to the rational basis test.135
Still, although the level of scrutiny imposed by a reasonable
relationship test is not necessarily equivalent to the level of scrutiny imposed by a rough proportionality test, the Court did not
otherwise distinguish the two tests. Rather, the Court seemed
generally satisfied with the consensus position of the state courts,
noting "general agreement" with only "semantical differences. . . ."" Therefore, while the reasonable relationship test
may not be the precise standard mandated by Dolan, for now it
affords a good approximation of the required level of scrutiny on
regulatory exactions in the wake of that decision. 37
Following the lead of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's seminal
decision in Jordan v Village of Menomonee Falls,3 ' at least sev-

"narrow tailoring" requirement employed in First Amendment cases. As explained in
Frisby v Schultz, "[a] statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than
the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to remedy." 487 US 474, 485 (1988) (citation omitted).
This is much the same as saying that an exaction is permissible so long as it remedies the
exact impact of the new development.
13 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2319.
13 Id.
Id.
One commentator has suggested that "in announcing the 'rough proportionality'
test, the Court did not merely change the name of the 'reasonable relationship'
test... [but] created a standard different than the 'reasonable relationship' test adopted
by the state courts." Glover-Ettrich, Casenote, 28 Creighton L Rev at 584 (cited in note
14). While it may be that in identifying the rough proportionality test with the reasonable
relationship test the Court is pulling a proverbial "bait-and-switch," such duplicity is
hardly apparent from the face of the Dolan opinion. Dolan does not define the rough
proportionality test in any great detail. Therefore, the state cases that allegedly inspired
the new test provide the only concrete guidance as to its content.
1"3 28 Wis 2d 608, 137 NW2d 442 (1965).
'
'
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en other jurisdictions have adopted some form of the reasonable
relationship test."9 Dolan cited five of these decisions, including
Jordan, and one decision of the Ninth Circuit as evidence of the
majority position on the required impact/exaction relationship."" Dolan provides the following description of this reasonable relationship test:
The distinction, therefore, which must be made between an
appropriate exercise of the police power and an improper
exercise of eminent domain is whether the requirement has
some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which
the property is being made or is merely being used as an
excuse for taking property simply because at that particular
moment4 the landowner is asking the city for some license or
permit.' '
In two of the cases cited by Dolan, the courts found the required reasonable relationship lacking. Both cases, however,
suggest that a well informed municipality could meet the requirement without significantly altering the manner or extent of its
exactions program. In Parks v Watson, the municipality admitted
that the value of the easement it sought in exchange for development approval greatly exceeded the impact of the development,
but asserted that there was no taking because the municipality
could have withheld approval altogether. However, this "lesser power inheres in the greater power" reasoning had been
soundly defeated in a long line of unconstitutional conditions
cases.' Indeed, few fact patterns could have been easier for a
court applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine than one
including the unapologetic admission that the municipality was
using its police power leverage to acquire a benefit disproportionate to the impact of the development. The municipality had preordained its own defeat by admitting that it sought to gain a
windfall through its regulatory authority, and, after Parks, no
12

Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach, Please!:Nollan v. California Coastal

Commission and a Rational-Nexus ConstitutionalAnalysis of Development Exactions, 69
BU L Rev 823, 868-70 & n 301 (1989).
"4 Dolan, 114 S Ct at 2319.
141 Id, quoting Simpson v City of North Platte, 206 Neb 240, 292 NW2d 297, 301
(1980).
142 716 F2d 646, 650-52 (9th Cir 1983).
14 The Parks court cited Perry v Sindermann, 408 US 593 (1972), Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v Railroad Commission, 271 US 583 (1926), Stephenson v Binford, 287 US
251 (1932), Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513 (1958), and Elfbrandt v Russell, 384 US 11
(1966). Parks, 716 F2d at 650, 652.
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municipality with competent legal advice should make the same
mistake. Thus, the failure of the municipality to meet the reasonable relationship test in Parks does not suggest that the standard
imposes any significant hurdle to the exactions program of a well
informed municipality.
The judicial invalidation of the municipality's exaction in
Simpson v City of North Platte was equally unindicative of elevated scrutiny under the reasonable relationship test."M The
case involved the conditioning of a permit to build a fast food restaurant upon the dedication of land for the construction of a
public street extension. Two constitutional defects invalidated the
exaction. First, the city did not even allege that it planned to
build the street extension once the land was dedicated. Although
the city's comprehensive plan proposed an extension of the existing street, "no project was immediately contemplated whereby
the street would be constructed nor [was] there any evidence regarding what the particular project would involve."' Thus, the
city was merely engaging in "land banking": reserving the land
for some possible but unspecified and unscheduled future use. "
Second, the city provided no record evidence that the construction
of the restaurant would create the need for a street extension. If
it did not, then the exaction would have transgressed Nollan's
essential nexus requirement; the issue of proportionality would
have been irrelevant." Therefore, the Dolan Court's citation to
Simpson's reasonable relationship merely reaffirms its commitment to the essential nexus requirement, and says little about
the proportionality requirement.
Parks and Simpson indicate that the reasonable relationship
test does have teeth at the margin. When a city expressly admits
that it seeks to gain a regulatory windfall, or engages in overt
land banking, courts should invalidate the condition almost as a
matter of course. However, evidence that the test has teeth in
extreme cases does not suggest that it imposes exacting scrutiny
in most situations. The contrary may in fact be true. If the
paradigmatic cases for invalidation under the reasonable relationship test are instances of extreme abuse of the exaction pow-

206 Neb 240, 292 NW2d 297 (1980).
292 NW2d at 301.
146

Id.

"' Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion in Dolan asserts that Simpson employed

"unspecified grounds roughly equivalent to Nollan's 'essential nexus' requirement." 114 S
Ct at 2323 (Stevens dissenting).
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er, courts applying the test to more ordinary exactions will likely
be deferential to municipal authorities.
The cases cited in Dolan upholding exactions support this
intuition. The four cases, Jordan,'" Call v City of West Jordan,149 City of College Station v Turtle Rock Corp,50 and
Collis v City of Bloomington, 5' present the typical exactions
pattern, in which municipalities require land developers to dedicate a portion of their land for some public use in exchange for
development approval." 2 In these cases, subdividers challenged
municipal ordinances requiring dedication of percentages of the
subdivided land for use as parks, schools, flood-control zones, and
recreational facilities, and the courts uniformly found reasonable
relationships between the impacts of the developments and the
exacted land. 53
Two related facets of the cases illustrate the liberality of this
reasonable relationship standard. First, these cases treat reasonableness of the relationship between the impact and the exaction
as a particular and fact-specific inquiry. In Turtle Rock, the case
that addresses this issue most directly, the court began its discussion of the takings issue with an obligatory but sloganistic
observation: "The question of whether a police power regulation
is proper or whether it constitutes a compensable taking is a
question of law and not of fact."" Nevertheless, noted the
court, a consideration of all the circumstances is required. Ultimately, the reasonableness test is a "fact-sensitive" inquiry, requiring "careful analysis of the facts.... "" The procedural
posture of the case illustrated well the importance of this observation. The trial court had granted summary judgment in favor
of the developer, and the court of appeals had affirmed.'5 6 Despite its invocation of the question-of-law standard, the Texas
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for trial based on its

"s 137 NW2d 442.
19

606 P2d 217 (Utah 1979).

15 680 SW2d 802 (Tex 1984).
151 310 Minn 5, 246 NW2d 19 (1976).
152

See Connors and High, 50 L & Contemp Probs at 70 (cited in note 4) ("The most

common and least controversial type of exaction is an intradevelopment dedication of land
for streets, sidewalks, water and sewer lines, and, more recently, land for recreational or
educational purposes.").
" Jordan, 137 NW2d at 448-49; Call, 606 P2d at 220; Turtle Rock, 680 SW2d at 806;
Collis, 246 NW2d at 26.
.. 680 SW2d at 804 (citations omitted).
155Id.
6 City of College Station v Turtle Rock Corp, 666 SW2d 318 (Tex Ct App 1984).
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analysis of the facts. Thus, whether or not the reasonable relationship test is nominally a question of law, it was applied in
Turtle Rock as a question of fact.
The other three cases also support the proposition that the
reasonable relationship test is basically a fact-driven standard. In
Collis, the Minnesota Supreme Court characterized the "reasonable portion" requirement as "a facts-and-circumstances test"
that "consider[s] the myriad [ ] factors which may bear on a
municipality's needs for certain kinds of facilities and the relationship of a particular subdivision to those needs."" 7 Similarly,
the Jordan court engaged in what amounted to a sufficiency-ofthe-evidence review, inquiring whether there was "a reasonable
basis for the finding that the need for the acquisition was occasioned by the activity of the subdivider."" 8 Finally, the Call
court gave the takings issue and the reasonable relationship test
such short shrift that it is impossible to discern exactly where
the court stood on the question of fact/question of law issue. However, the brevity of the Call court's discussion suggests that the
trial court's
treatment of the factual determinations was dispos59
itive.1

What emerges from the cases is a consensus position that,
although a reviewing court may have some role in assessing the
reasonableness of the impact/exaction relationship, that determination is a fact-specific inquiry best left to the lower court, or
perhaps even to the administrative body that made the original
determination of proportionality. 6 ' This suggests that the reasonable relationship test is nothing close to strict scrutiny. As a
general proposition, appellate courts reviewing governmental
actions under strict scrutiny do not rest their conclusions upon
fact-specific inquiries undertaken by lower courts. 6 ' Leaving
'' 246 NW2d at 26.
15 137 NW2d at 447.
159

The district court denied the developer's request for injunctive relief. Call, 606 P2d

at 221-22.
'" How much deference the judicial trier of fact should accord the planning
commission's quasi-legislative determinations regarding the proportionality of the impact/exaction relationship is a difficult issue of administrative law not squarely addressed
in Dolan. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findingsof Fact, 87 Nw U L Rev 14
(1992). For present purposes it is sufficient to note that regardless of how little deference
a trier of fact might accord quasi-legislative determinations, deference to the lower court's
finding on appellate review is generally indicative of a low standard of scrutiny.
,' See, for example, Robert C. Power, Affirmative Action and JudicialIncoherence, 55
Ohio St L J 79, 159 (1994) (arguing fact-intensive analysis in equal protection cases is at
odds with strict scrutiny); Lori Jayne Hoffman, Note, Fatal in Fact: An Analysis of the
Application of the Compelling Governmental Interest Leg of Strict Scrutiny in City of
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the adjudication of a constitutional right to the discretion of the
trier of fact tends to weaken the right.162 While there has been
some suggestion that appellate deference to a fact-intensive inquiry by a lower court is characteristic of intermediate scrutiny," it is flatly inconsistent with the protective scrutiny usually accorded the preferred freedoms in the Carolene Products regime. "' Thus, when the Turtle Rock court characterized the
reasonable relationship test as "fact-sensitive," it was signalling
its resolve not to become enmeshed in deciding the proportionality question on appellate review. Not surprisingly, the reasonable
relationship test is usually used to affirm the constitutionality of
exactions.'65
The second reason to believe that the reasonable relationship
test does not impose heightened scrutiny lies in the courts' failure to analyze the impact/exaction relationship according to any
numerical or quantitative metric. Dolan made clear that "[n]o
precise mathematical calculation is required .

,,16'
Yet, the

treatment of the rough proportionality test as a fact-intensive
inquiry assumes some sort of quantification of the impact/exaction relationship; implicit in the rough proportionality
and reasonable relationship tests is the requirement that the
development impact be approximately equal to the exaction. As
discussed below, Jordan, Collis, Turtle Rock, and Call demon-

strate that the metric for comparing the development impact to
the exaction is not primarily economic, and that even when numbers are considered by courts, they are at best very round numbers. Again, this imprecision is not indicative of heightened scrutiny.

Richmond v. JA. Croson, 70 BU L Rev 889, 908 (1990) (stating that in Croson, Justice
Stevens "rejected the imposition of strict scrutiny and advocated a more fact-specific

standard").
" See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 Yale L J 853, 858 n
28 (1991) (arguing fact-specific analysis under the First Amendment results in too little
protection of speech because it overemphasizes the harm of the regulated speech and
minimizes the systemic benefits of free speech).
" See Power, 55 Ohio St L J at 158-59 n 284 (cited in note 161) (treating intermediate scrutiny as consistent with fact-intensive analysis); Schwartz, 37 Am U L Rev at 36-37
(cited in note 39) (noting intermediate scrutiny under the Takings Clause is fact-specific).
" Indeed, the reasonable relationship test's fact-specific, ad hoc approach to exactions
is reminiscent of the Pennsylvania Central approach, which has been characterized as
eviscerating the Takings Clause. See note 44 and accompanying text.
" Other state court decisions employing a reasonable relationship test to validate
exactions include Holmes v PlanningBoard, 78 AD2d 1, 433 NYS2d 587 (1980), and Home
Builders Association v City of Kansas City, 555 SW2d 832 (Mo 1977).
166 114 S Ct at 2319.
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The Jordan court made a greater effort than did the other
courts to cite record evidence regarding the quantitative relationship between the proposed development's projected impact and
the land exacted. The court noted testimony by a planning expert
that "for a good environment for human habitation for each family in the area there should be a minimum of three thousand
square feet of land devoted to park and school purposes."'6 The
ordinance in question required the developer to dedicate two
hundred dollars worth of land per residential lot for use as school
grounds, parks, or recreational areas. The link between the needs
created by the development of each residential lot and the dedication of two hundred dollars worth of land per lot was explained
as follows: "After some study of average land values in the village, the village planning commission and the village board determined that land valued at $200 would by and large provide
the added park and school lands required for each family

....

,,168

Two significant observations should be made about this approach. First, the metric used to evaluate the need created, and
consequently the required dedication, was not directly related to
the actual economic impact of the development. A system of more
exacting scrutiny would determine the proportionality issue by
ascertaining the marginal economic burden imposed by each
additional residential lot on the surrounding community. Instead,
the expert testimony in Jordan addressed how much recreational
and educational land use was necessary to create "a good environment for human habitation."" 9 The implicit in-kind compensation question, and hence the relevant metric, was ascertained
according to an evaluation of subjective human needs at a highly
generalized level, and not according to a more empirically
quantifiable evaluation of the economic burdens imposed by the
particular development. '
Second, the comparative valuation issue was addressed in
very round numbers. The court indicated that three thousand
square feet were required per developed lot, and that this "by

1" Jordan, 137 NW2d at 448.
16 Id at 446.
'

Id at 448.

The Jordan court's approach to comparative valuation is a difficult one to handle
with empirical precision. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: PrivateProperty and the Power
of Eminent Domain 200 (Harvard 1985) ("Measuring the value of the property taken and
the compensation provided in exchange is especially difficult because the benefits of many
programs are in the form of public goods, which are notoriously difficult to value.").
"7'
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and large" accounted for the required dedication of two hundred
dollars worth of land.17 The only link between these two figures was an unspecified "study of average land values."172 Apparently, the court considered the specific quantitative findings of
the study not important enough to warrant mention. While it is
difficult to generalize about this approach with so few details, it
is clear that this permutation of the reasonable relationship test
is a far cry from the sort of fastidious quantification required by
stricter scrutiny, such as the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test.
If Jordan's approach to quantification is significant because
it eschews economic comparisons and mathematical precision, the
other three cases are significant in that they eschew any mention
of quantitative findings. 73 The Collis court simply noted that
"[i]t may be impossible to determine to everyone's satisfaction the
precise point at which" the required relationship exists.'74 The
court simply accepted a legislative determination by the city that
as a general rule 10 percent of the developed land should be dedicated because developers could "rebut this statement in a judicial
175 Thus, the court permitted the city to
review proceeding ....
shift the burden of proof regarding quantification to the developer
by making a generalized legislative determination. The Turtle
Rock and Call courts ignored the quantification problem altogether. Given that neither court undertook empirical or numerical
inquiries, the reasonable relationship test appears in both these
cases to have been understood as only requiring qualitative symmetry, and perhaps prohibiting grossly disproportionate exactions.'76
That the reasonable-relationship courts avoided economic
and quantitative analysis suggests that future courts will likewise defer to the factual determinations of municipal regulators
in exactions litigation. If a court accepts as prima facie evidence
of proportionality a city's estimate of the land necessary for
healthy human habitation, then the burden of adducing hard
"' Jordan, 137 NW2d at 446.
172 Id.
17 This is not necessarily to say that the lower courts made no quantitative findings
or individualized determinations, which Dolan's rough proportionality test does ultimately
require. Rather, it suggests that if such determinations were made, they were not considered relevant or reviewable on appeal.
174 246 NW2d at 25, quoting John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 Cornell L Q 871, 924 (1967).
17 Collis, 246 NW2d at 27.
176 See Turtle Rock, 680 SW2d at 806-07; Call, 606 P2d at 221.
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empirical evidence to the contrary, a potentially Herculean task,
shifts to the developer.'7 7 Calculating the economic value of
public goods is generally a difficult undertaking,'7 8 and this
burden will be particularly heavy on the developer, who is in a
far worse position than the municipality to quantify the need for
public goods created by the improvement. 7 9 Therefore, while
the reasonable relationship test does require some finding of
quantitative proportionality, it allows the municipality considerable latitude in defining that proportionality. "Rough proportionality" is rough indeed.
Fact-specific yet number-shy, the reasonable relationship test
invites affirmance of development exactions in all but the most
extortionate circumstances. Deferring to lower courts and administrative bodies, courts of appeal usually employ the test in a
loose, qualitative fashion. Dolan's adoption of an exaction test
drawn from the principle of reasonable relationship tends to
negate, rather than to support, the proposition that the Takings
Clause warrants increased judicial scrutiny after Dolan.
C. Related Tests in Nontakings Contexts
Although the rough proportionality test is new to the Takings Clause, an equivalent concept has been employed by federal
courts of appeal in a variety of constitutional contexts. On the
one hand, it is somewhat difficult to isolate uses of this rough
proportionality concept because of the semantic similarity of the
terms "rational basis" and "reasonable relationship," a source of
confusion recognized by the Dolan majority. 8 ' However, it is

Dolan itself, it appeared that a flat assertion of proportionality by the city would
have sufficed to shift the burden of proof back to the developer. The fatal flaw as to the
pathway exaction was the city's finding that the pathway "could" offset some traffic
demand, rather than it "will" or "is likely to" offset some traffic demand. Dolan, 114 S Ct
at 2322. The Court characterized this finding as a failure by the city "to quantify its findings... beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand
generated." Id. Therefore, the Court implied that the substitution of "will" for "could"
would have legitimized the exaction.
See Epstein, Takings at 200 (cited in note 170).
See, for example, Elizabeth Becker and Cotton M. Lindsay, Does the Government
Free Ride?, 37 J L & Econ 277, 277 (1994) (Ascertaining valuations of public goods from
private individuals may be problematic because free rider considerations make individuals
reluctant to reveal their valuations to the government.); Christine M. Augustyniak, Economic Valuation of Services Provided by Natural Resources: Putting a Price on the "Priceless", 45 Baylor L Rev 389, 392-96 (1993) (noting that lack of distinct markets in public
goods, such as recreational sites, poses special challenges to valuing public goods through
private demand).
' 114 S Ct at 2319. The mess is further compounded by the Court's interchangeable
177 In
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possible to identify some nontakings cases that have employed
rough proportionality concepts the same as or similar to that announced in Dolan.
Thus, even though the Court in Dolan cited no precedents in
announcing the test, it was clearly not beginning with a blank
slate. The slogan "rough proportionality" has been used in a
number of other cases, many of them fairly irrelevant to the
current discussion. 8 ' Other cases, however, have used a rough
proportionality or similar standard to express the same sort of
requirement that the Court expressed in Dolan. An exhaustive
study of all such cases is not feasible, but a survey of a few cases
approving governmental exactions or penalties on a basis similar
to the Dolan standard reinforces the proposition that the Dolan
test does not impose heightened scrutiny on takings claims.
The key concept defining the rough proportionality test is
that when the government requires a party to surrender a vested
right in exchange for receiving a government benefit, or causing a
social detriment, the value of the right surrendered and the right
bestowed must be comparable. A First Circuit case illustrates the
use of this concept under the First Amendment. In Vote Choice,
Inc. v DiStefano, the court rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a state law requiring that recipients of public gubernatorial
campaign funds observe statutory limits on campaign spending.'82 Although First Amendment doctrine is quite different
from Takings Clause doctrine, the court's analysis was remarkably similar to the analysis of Nollan and Dolan."3 The court

use of the terms "rational relation" and "rational basis." See, for example, City of Mesquite
v Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 US 283, 302-03 (1982); Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 407
(1978) (Rehnquist dissenting); Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v Hodory, 431 US
471, 489 (1977). This sort of linguistic wrangling appears to have been the motive for the
creation of the rough proportionality test, which avoids the words "rational," "reasonable,"
"basis," and "relationship."
' See, for example, Hotel Employers Association v Gorsuch, 669 F2d 1305, 1309 (9th
Cir 1982) (employing rough proportionality concept under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act); Atlantic Richfield Co. v American Airlines, Inc., 836 F Supp 763, 774-77 (N D Okla
1993) (analyzing and rejecting the "proportionate rule" under CERCLA).
One week after Dolan, the Court handed down its decision in Johnson v De Grandy,
holding that the Voting Rights Act is not violated where "in spite of continuing discrimination and racial bloc voting, minority voters form effective voting majorities in a number
of districts roughly proportionalto the minority voters' respective shares in the voting-age
population." 114 S Ct 2647, 2651 (1994) (emphasis added). See also United States v
Gigante, 39 F3d 42, 47 (2d Cir 1994) (holding that sentencing guidelines require some
rough proportionality between the weight of the evidence of uncharged conduct and
degree of adjustment or departure).
2 4 F3d 26, 43 (1st Cir 1993).
" The DiStefano analysis was based largely on one of the Supreme Court's holdings
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noted that "the law achieves a rough proportionality between the
advantages available to complying candidates... and the restrictions that such candidates must accept to receive these advantages.""u Given the absence of coercion and the voluntariness of
the transaction, "the state exact[ed] a fair price from complying
candidates in exchange for receipt of the challenged benefits. 8 '
While it might be thought that the use of the rough proportionality standard under the First Amendment, a provision of the
Bill of Rights usually subject to strict scrutiny, indicates an elevation of scrutiny in Dolan, the very opposite is apparent from
the face of DiStefano. At the same time the DiStefano court was
upholding the spending cap for public fund recipients, it was
striking down a Political Action Committee ("PAC") disclosure
requirement under the First Amendment strict scrutiny standard. ' 6 This indicates that the rough proportionality test is reserved for exaction-type situations and that it is significantly
easier to meet than traditional strict scrutiny. The disclosure
requirement, where no reciprocity of advantage was in question,
was required to "serve a compelling governmental interest" and
demonstrate a "substantial nexus ... between the served interest
and the information to be revealed."" 7 On the other hand, the
court deemed the exacted conditions constitutionally permissible
even though they did not achieve "exact balance," because they
did not "stray beyond the pale, creating disparities so profound
that they bec[ame] impermissibly coercive."' DiStefano illustrates the substantial difference between the strict scrutiny characteristic of the "preferred" freedoms of the Bill of Rights8 9 and
the rough proportionality test employed to determine "fair price"
in exchanges between the government and the people.

in Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 143 (1976) (upholding expenditure limitations for candidates accepting federal funds under Subtitle H of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971). DiStefano, 4 F3d at 31-33.
'" DiStefano, 4 F3d at 39.
M5 Id.
"' Id at 29. PACs were required to file a notice listing their goals and purposes, the
positions they planned to advocate, the names of candidates they intended to support, and
the names and addresses of their officers. The Court invalidated this requirement because
it failed to meet the following two-part test: "(1) the statute as a whole must serve a compelling governmental interest, and (2) a substantial nexus must exist between the served
interest and the information to be revealed." Id at 31-32 (citations omitted).
" Id at 32, citing Brown v Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Commission, 459 US 87,
91-92 (1982), and Buckley, 424 US at 64.
'
DiStefano, 4 F3d at 38.
'
In Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 115 (1943), the Court explained that the
First Amendment enjoys a preferred position in the catalogue of constitutional rights.

234

The University of Chicago Law Review

[63:199

A related line of reasoning is discernible in Equal Protection
Clause challenges to development impact fees. In Shell Island
Investment v Town of Wrightsville Beach, the Fourth Circuit
upheld a sewage infrastructure impact fee assessed against a
developer of a residential area that would have increased the
municipality's population by over 20 percent and accounted for 75
percent of all new growth.19 Shell Island is particularly useful
in that it distinguishes, perhaps unwittingly, the sort of rational
basis review rejected by the Dolan Court and the sort of rational
relationship analysis it accepted.' Under traditional rational
basis review, the court inquires whether the legislative classification is rationally related to a permissible governmental objective under any conceivable set of facts. 9 ' In Shell Island, the
developer made no claim that impact fees were a per se irrational
means of meeting infrastructure costs, but rather that the
amount of fees assessed against the developer bore no rational
relationship to the actual amount of needed improvement to the
infrastructure.'93 In assessing this claim, the court quietly
slipped from its general discussion of "reasonable basis" review to
a more specific discussion of whether "the impact fee bore a rational relationship between the burden and its bearer."'94 Stated differently, the court inquired whether the need created by the
development was "in any way disproportionate" to the costs assessed on the developer.'95 In the language of DiStefano, one
might have inquired whether the city was charging Shell Island
a "fair price" for its use of the municipal infrastructure.
The court's response was almost identical to the Dolan formulation. "[M]athematical precision [was] not required" to sustain the reasonableness of the relationship.'96 The district court
had found that Shell Island's anticipated growth would create a
necessity for additional sewage capacity, and this determination
"9

1990 WL 41050, *5-7 (4th Cir) (unpublished opinion).

191 Shell Island is another good example of confusing low level scrutiny terminology.

The opinion employs the term "reasonable basis" in lieu of "rational basis," and the term
"rational relationship" to capture the "reasonable relation" or "rough proportionality"
concept employed in Dolan. 1990 WL 41050, *5-6.
1
See, for example, Morey v Doud, 354 US 457, 464 (1957).
193 1990 WL 41050, *5.
194 Id *6. It is unclear from the opinion whether the court recognized that it was departing from a rational basis analysis in discussing the "rational relationship" requirement. The discussion is permeated with traditional rational basis slogans. The analysis,
however, is more in line with the reasonable relationship approach that gave birth to the
rough proportionality test.
195Id.
196 Id.
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was sufficient. Even though the city had described its fee adjustment as "arbitrary," this, the Court determined "was simply a
concession that the threefold increase figure was not a mathematically precise one... .""' The city had made some attempt
to quantify the need created by the development, and, "arbitrary"
or not, it was sufficient.
This reasoning is instructive in interpreting the Dolan mandate that the municipality "make some sort of individualized
determination," though not necessarily a "precise mathematical
calculation." 9 ' Although it seems rather unlikely, given recent
trends in the Court's jurisprudence, that the Court would accept
a concededly arbitrary assessment of the impact/dedication relationship, Shell Island's use of the "rational relationship" concept
hints at the level of fact finding required under a rough proportionality test. Once the city recites its finding as to the impact/dedication relationship, the reasonable relationship test
requires minimal review of that determination.
DiStefano and Shell Island illustrate the use of the rough
proportionality concept in situations where the private party is
seeking some government benefit or subsidy, such as campaign
funds or the use of public infrastructure. The same inquiry sometimes arises where the private party's conduct creates a social
detriment. There, the issue is the proportionality of the relationship between the impact of the conduct and the penalty imposed.
Two federal circuit court opinions illustrate the use of the rough
proportionality concept under the Eighth Amendment and the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
In United States v Tilley, the Fifth Circuit was faced with a
criminal defendant's claim that prosecution for a drug offense-already the subject of a successful civil forfeiture action-constituted double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.'99 The Fifth Circuit noted that under the Supreme
Court's precedent, civil forfeiture sanctions constitute criminal
punishment only where the "amount of the sanction is 'overwhelmingly disproportionate' to the damages caused by the
wrongful conduct and thus 'bears no rational relation to the goal
Characterof compensating the government for its loss .. .
izing this "rational relation" test as a requirement of "rough pro-

197
".

Id.
114 S Ct at 2319.
18 F3d 295, 297 (5th Cir 1994).
Id at 298, quoting United States v Halper,490 US 435, 448-49 (1989).
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portionality between the [ I sanction and the resulting governmental and societal costs,"2"' the Tilley court rejected the claim
that the $650,000 forfeiture constituted punishment. Although
the costs to the government and society of the defendant's drug
dealing were "incapable of exact measurement,"0 2 the court cited various estimates of these costs and proceeded at a macroeconomic level. 0 3 On the basis of estimated national figures,
the court concluded that the required rough proportionality between the impact of the defendant's illegal actions and the
amount of the forfeiture was present.2 Thus, Tilley's approach
to rough proportionality suggests that the test may be employed
by courts as a fairness mantra to approve, without undertaking
detailed factual inquiries, property exactions that do not seem
grossly inequitable.
Courts have used a similar rough proportionality test in
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment cases. In
United States v Lizza Industries, Inc., the Second Circuit held
that "[clalculation of [RICO] forfeiture[s] based on gross rather
than net profits from illegal activity does not destroy [the] rough
proportionality" between the magnitude of the defendant's criminal enterprise and the punishment dispensed.0 5 This notion of
the punishment quantitatively fitting the crime may be compared
to the DiStefano court's "fair price" slogan for First Amendment
exactions. As in every other rough proportionality test, this test
did not require "complex computations" of the impact/penalty
relationship.0 6 A quick eyeballing of the situation by the court
appeared to suffice. Substantial deference was accorded to the
trier of fact, in this case the district judge, suggesting that appellate review of rough proportionality determinations is narrow in
scope.

21 Tilley, 18 F3d at 299.
202

Id.

203

In order to justify the amount of drug proceeds confiscated in the particular case,

the court cited estimates that illegal drug sales cost the government and society $60-120
billion per year. Id, citing Martin Wolf, Thinking about drug legalisation, Fin Times
Section I at 19 (Sept 4, 1989), 134 Cong Rec S15630 (Oct 12, 1988) (statement of Sen
Danforth), and Drug Abuse Cost to U.S. May Be 125 Billion Dollars-Study, Reuter
Library Report, LEXIS (Sept 5, 1991).
204 Interestingly, the Tilley court cited two recent takings cases in its opinion. 18 F3d
at 300, citing Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S Ct 2886, 2894 (1992), and
Pennsylvania Central, 438 US at 124.
20- 775 F2d 492, 498 (2d Cir 1985).
20

Id.
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This survey of cases arising under the free speech, equal
protection, cruel and unusual punishment, and double jeopardy
provisions of the Constitution cannot provide a definitive interpretation of the Dolan rough proportionality test. Rather, it illustrates the sorts of reasoning that courts use, and the sorts of
results that courts reach, when employing analogous tests. The
mere fact that all four cases surveyed affirmed the governmental
actions in question does not necessarily prove that the test imposes low level scrutiny. However, the manner in which the
courts assessed proportionality does suggest deference to the
executive entity whose decision instigated the litigation and to
the trier of fact below. If this pattern carries over to the land use
area in the wake of Dolan, municipal regulators will not find
their individualized determinations carefully scrutinized by the
judiciary, and the poor relation dictum will remain just
that--dictum.
CONCLUSION

However strong the temptation to pronounce Carolene Products dead and to call Dolan its eulogy, such a pronouncement
would be premature. The only accurate expositor of a cryptic
Supreme Court dictum is the Supreme Court in future cases.
Nollan received a hero's welcome from property rights activists
and libertarians, and rotten eggs from environmentalists and
land use regulators. Eight years later, however, it has spawned
no elevated scrutiny in the lower courts, belying the expectations
of detractors and advocates alike. Now along comes
Dolan-apparently elevating the Takings Clause, in dictum, from
its inferior status in the pantheon of the Bill of Rights, and at
the same time seemingly repudiating the entire Carolene
Products constitutional regime. However, close examination suggests that whatever use the Court makes of the poor relation dictum in the future, Dolan does not significantly elevate Takings
Clause scrutiny. The revolution may come tomorrow, but it did
not come today.
The basis for this conclusion is the fairly low level of scrutiny
that the new rough proportionality test imposes on exactions. It
is difficult to fit the test within the traditional trifurcated scheme
of low, intermediate, and strict scrutiny; many commentators
made similar, unsuccessful attempts with Nollan's rational nexus
test."7 Still, analysis of the rough proportionality test indicates
...See notes 65-70 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is important to remem-
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that it will not impose significant new hurdles to land use regulations or to exactions. In rejecting the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test, in characterizing the new requirement as
something akin to the reasonable relationship test, and in choosing a form of words that signals a jurisprudential approach almost invariably approving of governmental action, the Dolan
Court failed to substantiate the poor relation dictum. Instead, it
formulated a test that will fit snugly into the jurisprudential
status quo.
While it would be hasty to trumpet the death of Carolene
Products on the basis of Dolan, it would be overly skeptical to
ignore the Court's renewed interest in the Takings Clause. Recent cases such as Nollan, First English, Lucas v South Carolina
Coastal Council, and Dolan itself do indicate a partial revival of
constitutional property rights. Given the truly strict scrutiny
with which Court watchers read every word of every opinion
concerning such "hot" areas of constitutional law as takings, it
would be naive to assume that the poor relation dictum was promulgated with no polemical intent. Indeed, the poor relation
dictum may flourish into a constitutional revolution to replace
Carolene Products's famed footnote 4. However, if the Dolan
majority intended to make property rights full relatives in the
Bill of Rights family, it forgot to invite the Takings Clause to the
family reunion.

ber that in footnote 3 of Nollan, Justice Scalia disclaimed any relationship between the
rational basis test and the standard of review employed under the Takings Clause.
According to Scalia, governmental regulations of property must "substantially advance [)
the legitimate state interests." 483 US at 834 (citation omitted). Although some commentators characterized this test as intermediate scrutiny, see, for example, Dennis J. Coyle,
Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American Politics, 42 Cath U L Rev
817, 856 (1993), the traditional intermediate scrutiny test requires that classifications
serve "important governmental objectives" and that they be "substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 197 (1976). It therefore
seems less important to force the takings test into verbal slogans tailored to other provisions of the Constitution than to inquire whether the takings standards enunciated by the
Court will actually make it more difficult for regulators to prevail in exaction litigation.
This Comment suggests that however one might characterize the rough proportionality
test, it does not bring the Takings Clause near the level of protection afforded the preferred freedoms of the Bill of Rights.

